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I.  Introduction 
 
The effect of drug prohibition on drug consumption is a critical issue in debates over drug 
policy.    Prohibition  advocates  claim  drug  use  would  mushroom  if  drugs  were  legal,  while 
prohibition critics believe use would increase modestly, if at all.  Evidence on this issue is scarce 
due mainly to the lack of data on prohibited commodities. 
One  episode  that  provides  information  on  the  consumption-reducing  effect  of  drug 
prohibition is the Chinese legalization of opium in 1858.  India was a major opium producer 
opium during the 19
th century, and the British East India Company exported much of this opium 
to China and other parts of Southeast Asia.  China prohibited the consumption and importation of 
opium during the early part of the century, but after the Second Opium War China yielded to 
British pressure and legalized opium. 
The critical feature of this episode is that the British East India Company kept records of 
the quantity and price of opium exports from India to China.   The exports from India were legal 
throughout the 1800s even though importation into China, and consumption within China, were 
prohibited until 1858.  Exportation occurred before this date because third party entrepreneurs 
purchased the opium in India and smuggled it into China.   If Chinaís opium prohibition reduced 
consumption to a substantial degree, legalization should have increased exports from India to 
China, unless legalization also spurred production within China.  In that case, however, Chinese 
substitution  of  domestic  for  imported  opium  should  have  reduced  the  export  price  of  Indian 
opium.   Thus, the joint behavior of opium exports and price can indicate whether prohibition 
reduced opium consumption. 
In this paper we examine the impact of Chinaís legalization of opium on the quantity and 
price  of  British  opium  exports  from  India  to  China  during  the  19
th  century.      We  find  little 
evidence that legalization increased exports or decreased price.   Thus, the evidence suggests 
Chinaís opium prohibition had a minimal impact on opium consumption.   2
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II provides background on the 
history  of  opium  in  China  and  on  the  British  participation  in  the  opium  trade.    Section  III 
examines the impact of legalization on opium exports and price.  Section IV concludes. 
 
II. Background on Opium and the History of Opium in China 
Opium is produced from the opium poppy, an annual flowering plant native to Turkey 
and  first  domesticated  in  the  Mediterranean  region  during  the  Roman  Empire.  The  plantís 
seedpod contains a latex solution that exudes if the pod is scored with a razor or other sharp 
instrument. This latex is known as raw opium, and it contains morphine, codeine, noscapine and 
other alkaloids with analgesic properties.   Raw opium can be eaten or diluted in liquid, but 
consumption in this form is unusual.   The standard approach is to boil raw opium and then dry it 
for smoking.
1   
The opium poppy was introduced into China between the 4
th and 7
th centuries by Arab 
traders, and it was cultivated widely for centuries before the East India Company began trading in 
Asia. An 11
th century Chinese medical doctor referred to opium as medicine, and it was used to 
cure diarrhea, induce sleep, and reduce the pain of diseases such as dysentery and cholera.
2 
The English arrived in China in 1637 and  were allowed to  open a trading station in 
Canton in 1715 (Beeching 1975, p.11).  During this time many Western powers imported both 
opium and tobacco into China.  In 1729, rising opium use prompted an imperial edict from Yung 
Ching  that  forbade  the  sale  of  opium  for  smoking  purposes.  In  1799,  an  imperial  edict  also 
prohibited importation of opium for smoking purposes.  Opiumís sale and use were ìclassed with 
robbery and instigation to murder, and punished with banishment or death.î   Importation was 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed account of the opium production process, see Booth (1996, Chapter 1). 
 
2 See http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/heroin/opiwar1.htm. 
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treated just as harshly, as ìthe opium on seizure is burnt, the vessel confiscated and the Chinese 
possessing it are liable to deathî   (Rowntree 1905, pp.6-13). 
The East India Company obtained an opium monopoly in Bengal in 1773, and in 1830 
the Company added Bombay opium to its sphere of control.  From the 1770s it began heavier 
trade  in  Canton.  While  official  Chinese  policy  barred  the  opium  trade  in  1799,  merchants 
welcomed the financial rewards. Often the English traded opium for tea at Canton.   
Leading up to the 1799 edict, the Chinese became more wary of the opium trade and the 
ever-expanding British influence in their country. Under pressure from the Chinese government, 
which  threatened  to  stop  the  profitable  tea  trade,  the  East  India  Company  stopped  exporting 
opium directly to China in 1796 and began selling in Calcutta to private English merchants. These 
merchants  delivered  the  opium  to  China,  but  the  Company  denied  responsibility  for  the 
smuggling and thus retained other trading rights. In both 1814 and 1831, the Emperor decreed 
even stricter laws against importation and sale of opium (Chang 1964, p.220).    
By the 1830ís the Chinese economy was in recession and the balance of trade had turned 
against China. The opium trade was blamed for the drainage of silver from the country and for the 
economic slowdown.  There was no reason to believe the opium trade was the main reason for the 
silver famine or the recession, but a corrupt army and weakened bureaucracy, combined with the 
slowed economy, made opium an easy scapegoat for the dynastyís problems (Polachek 1992, 
p.104). 
In  1836  the  Emperor  held  a  series  of  ìOpium  Debatesî  between  those  favoring 
legalization and those favoring further suppression of opium. Legalizers claimed the real issues 
with opium were organized crime and the silver drain that was ruining the economy. They argued 
that  legalizing  opium  and  taxing  it  would  generate  huge  revenues,  and  they  believed  that 
enforcing  opium  prohibition  would  be  expensive  and  strengthen  the  already  feared  lower 
bureaucracy  in China. The moralists claimed that disregard for the law was no reason to repeal it 
and that legalization would result in everyone smoking. They believed opium was evil and felt it   4
was the emperorís duty to save the people from this evil.  The legalizers appeared close to victory 
until a rival political faction thwarted the initiative (Polachek 1992, p.114).  
After the Opium Debates, opium addiction became a capital offense and eliminating the 
internal  trade  became  a  major  focus  of  the  Ching  dynasty.      Opium  prohibition  was  ìa  law 
condemning  opium  smokers  to  strangulation,  and  opium  dealers  to  decapitation.î  (Rowntree 
1905, p.65).  The crackdown on internal trade did not appear to reduce use, however, so the 
Emperor turned his attention to the foreigners who were bringing the opium to China.  
The Chinese tried to keep foreigners at arms length and scoffed at assertions of British 
superiority  (Beeching  1975,  p.50).    Smugglers  became  more  aggressive,  and  scuffles  with 
Chinese authorities only emboldened them.  The authorities were unable to bring smugglers to 
justice,  as  Chinese  officials  ìsteadily  accepted  bribes  and  acted  as  willing  accomplicesî 
(Rowntree,  p.27).    In  1839,  the  Chinese  made  a  last  effort  at  closing  off  their  country  to 
foreigners (Polachek  1992, p.103).    
Opium was a major point of foreign contact, so in 1839 the emperor assigned Lin Tseh-
Sen to the post of imperial commissioner with the task of ridding China of the opium problem.  
Commissioner Lin was already anti-opium, and he immediately used force against the British in 
Canton, seizing their opium and destroying it without compensation. The British were outraged 
but did not cease the trade, fighting their way up the river to trading ports and bringing more 
opium to Canton. The Chinese responded by stopping shipments of food to the British ships and 
poisoning their water supplies. Drunken  British sailors killed a Chinese villager, and Captain 
Elliot, who was seen as the British civil authority in the area, refused to allow the sailors to be 
tried under Chinese law.  
Commissioner Lin responded by sending Chinese junkships, which attacked British ships 
but did little harm. China continued to assert its superiority and sent letters to London warning the 
British  of  their  downfall  if  they  disobeyed  China.  The  British  responded  by  sending  more 
warships to Canton and destroying Linís army. Commissioner Lin lied to the emperor, claiming   5
stunning defeats of the barbaric British and giving short timetables for the end of the opium trade. 
Eventually the British captured strategic points on the coast and fortified and blockaded Canton, 
forcing Chinese surrender. Lin was banished and the Treaty of Nanjing was signed in 1842.
3 
The  treaty  gave  Hong  Kong  to  the  British  and  opened  new  ports  to  British  trade.  It 
forbade the Chinese from trying British sailors under Chinese law (extraterritoriality) and gave 
Britain ìmost-favored-nation statusî in trade.  Opium was not a major focus of the treaty, and the 
British negotiators were simply instructed to ìimpress upon the ChineseÖhow much it would be 
for the interest of that Government to legalize the trade.î  In particular, the British urged the 
Chinese to legalize and tax opium to alleviate their financial woes and gain control over the trade. 
The emperor disagreed, saying ìnothing will induce me to derive a revenue from the vice and 
misery of my peopleî (Rowntree 1905, p.71). 
The second Opium War broke out in 1856, when Canton officials boarded the Arrow, a 
vessel  accused  of  piracy,  and  ripped  down  a  British  flag.    British  ships  attacked  the  city  in 
response (Beeching 1975, p. 214). 
The British again won the war easily.  The Treaty of Tientsin, signed in June of 1858,  
contained no reference to the opium trade but further opened legal trade in favor of the British.
4 
Lord  Elgin,  the  British  negotiator,  saw  opium  as  a  deplorable  evil  rather  than  a  term  of 
negotiation.  He nevertheless believed it ìhadî to be legalized, yet he ìcould not bring himself to 
tell  the  Chinese  that  the  time  had  come  to  legalize  this  lucrative,  but  demoralizing  trafficî 
(Rowntree 1905, p. 87).  After the peace, the British again supported legalization as the only way 
to control the trade. China finally succumbed, stating, ìChina still retains her objection to the use 
of the drug on moral grounds, but the present generation of smokers, at all events, must and will 
                                                 
3 For further details, see Chang (1964, pp. 189-213)  and Waley (1995). 
 
4 Although the Treaty was signed in 1858, hostilities did not conclude until 1860. 
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have opiumî (Rowntree 1905, p.88).  The Chinese legalized opium in 1858, with a tariff of about 
8%.    
 
III.  Legalizationís Impact on Opium Exports and Price 
We now examine whether Chinaís legalization of opium led to a substantial increase in 
Chinese opium consumption.  Since data on Chinese opium consumption are not available, we 
use data on the quantity and price of opium exports from India to China.   The exportation of 
opium from India was legal throughout the 19
th century, so these data should indicate the amounts 
leaving India.    Assuming there was no substantial change in other sources of opium, the export 
data indicate the trends in Chinese opium consumption.
5    If there was a substantial increase in 
Chinese opium production, or in opium imported from a third country, exports from India to 
China would not indicate the behavior domestic consumption.  In this case, however, the shift in 
demand from Indian to Chinese opium should have depressed the export price of Indian opium.  
Thus,  examination  of  the  quantity  and  price  of  opium  exports  can  determine  the  impact  of 
legalization on Chinese opium consumption.
6   
 
Data 
The data sources for exports are Greenbergís (1951) British Trade and the Opening of 
China 1800-1842  for the period 1801-1839 and Financial and Commercial Statistics of British 
India (1903) for the period 1840-1902.
7  Greenbergís data are a compilation of contemporary 
                                                 
5 In fact, China initially legalized importation and consumption but not domestic production; in the early 
1870s, China legalized domestic production as well  (Rowntree 1905, pp.96-98).   Thus, there would not 
necessarily have been substantial substitution during the early legalization years in any case. 
 
6 The amount of opium imported into China from elsewhere rarely exceeded 5% and only got above 10% in 
the late 1870ís and early 1880ís.  Relatedly, the correlation between Indian exports and Chinese imports 
was 0.68 for the period 1863-1899.  (International Anti-Opium Association 1922, p.16).   
 
7 The two sources overlap for the years 1830-1839 and are similar for this period. 
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lists,  which  were  organized  in  Morseís  International  Relations,  Vol.  1.  The  Financial  and 
Commercial Statistics series are the recordings of the British East India Companyís sales at their 
scales for export to India. The opium was sold to merchants to be loaded onto boats headed for 
China. While it is possible some was rerouted by merchants, it is unlikely they lied as no higher 
tariff was charged for opium going to China as compared to any other export destination.  The 
series on total exports is the sum of two series, exports from Bengal and exports from Bombay. 
The data sources for export prices are Rowntree (1905, Appendix II, p.285) for the period 
1801-1829 and Financial and Commercial Statistics for the period 1831-1902.  The data are the 
prices at which the East India Company sold opium at the scales in India to individual merchants 
for shipment to China and elsewhere. 
 
Results 
Figure 2 presents data on exports of opium from India to China for the period 1801-1902.  
The data are measured in number of chests per Chinese population.  Overall there is a strong 
upward  trend,  beginning  around  1820.  This  trend  potentially  reflects  increasing  population, 
higher income, or an expanding taste for opium.  There is substantial volatility during certain 
periods, especially the war years (1839-1842 and 1855-1866).    
The key feature of the data is the absence of increased export growth after legalization.  If 
anything, the trend line becomes less steep around the time of legalization, and it eventually turns 
downward.  If  legalization  increased  consumption,  exports  should  have  grown  faster  after 
legalization, barring a substantial substitution toward domestically produced opium.  Thus, the 
raw data fail to indicate that legalization increased consumption.  
Table  1  examines  this  issue  more  carefully  by  presenting  regressions  of  exports  per 
Chinese population on a dummy for legalization, a dummy for the war periods,  the price of rice,   8
population, trend and trend squared.
8   The legalization dummy equals 0 through 1857 and 1 
thereafter.  The war dummy equals 1 in the years 1839-1842 and 1855-1866, and 0 otherwise. 
Both wars ended before the dates used, but upheaval that affected the opium trade continued until 
after the official ending dates. We include the price of rice as a proxy for the (inverse of) income.  
We include population as a further control for income or the taste for opium.  All regressions 
report Newey and West (1986) t-statistics. 
The results indicate that, after controlling for pre-existing trends, there is little effect of 
legalization on opium exports.   The results in column (1) indicate that exports from India to 
China were higher post-legalization.    The results in column (2), which control for war periods, 
the price of rice, and population, are similar.  The results in columns (3) and (4), however, show 
that after controlling for a linear or quadratic trend, the estimated impact of legalization is either 
small and insignificantly positive or small and insignificantly negative.
9 
  The results therefore provide no evidence that legalization increased opium consumption. 
It is possible, however, that legalization caused a substitution from imported to domestic opium, 
at least after 1870 when China legalized domestic production.  To examine this hypothesis, we 
examine the price of opium exported from India.  If legalization caused a substantial substitution, 
the price of opium exports should have fallen after legalization. 
Figure 2 shows the price of opium at the scales in India.  The price is volatile early in the 
19
th century.
10  Prices appears to have increased (slightly) rather than decreased after legalization, 
which  is  the  opposite  of  what  should  have  occurred  due  to  a  substitution  from  imported  to 
domestic opium.    Table  2  examines  the  impact  of  legalization  on  the  price  of  opium 
exports. The coefficient on legalization is negative without controls for pre-existing trends but 
                                                 
8 Data on population are from Mitchell (1982).  Data on the price of rice are from Wang (1992).  
 
9 We have also estimated these regressions for the 1831-1902 period, since the imperial prohibition opium 
strengthened in 1831, and for the 1840-1902 period, since the data source for exports changes in 1840.  
These auxiliary regressions show if anything less impact of legalization on exports. 
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insignificantly positive with controls for pre-existing trends.  There is no evidence, therefore, that 
legalization changed the path of export prices. 
  
IV. Conclusions 
This paper has demonstrated that Chinaís legalization of opium in 1858 was not associated with a 
perceptible increase in opium consumption.  This conclusion is subject to several caveats, most 
importantly that it rests on data for opium exports from India to China, not on direct observation 
of Chinese opium consumption.  Nevertheless, the export data fail to provide even a hint that 
prohibition had reduced consumption. 
  The  other  main  caveat  is  that  this  conclusion  may  not  apply  to  other  prohibitions.  
Beyond the obvious differences in time and place, there is little evidence the Chinese government 
expended  substantial  resources  attempting  to  enforce  opium  prohibition,  despite  its  ample 
rhetoric.      Thus,  it  is  not  surprising  the  prohibition  had  minimal  impact.      This  episode 
nevertheless raises a cautionary note about the impact of weakly enforced prohibitions, and the 
abundant evasion and corruption spawned by Chinaís opium prohibition are reminders of the 
constraints faced by any prohibition, even one with significant enforcement. 
                                                                                                                                                
10 Note, however, that the data source for the earlier years is different than for later years.    10
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Table 1: The Effect of Legalization on Per Capita Opium Exports from India to China   
 
 
Independent  
Variable         (1)       (2)         (3)         (4) 
   
 
Constant    52.3    51.1    486.6    751.0 
      (4.29)    (0.38)    (2.95)    (9.94) 
 
Legalization     134.9    131.8    18.7    -18.4 
      (8.11)    (9.67)    (0.63)    (1.22) 
 
War          50.7    51.7    4.09 
          (2.90)    (3.99)    (0.59) 
 
Price of Rice         -56.0    -39.0    -10.9 
          (5.23)    (3.23)    (2.61) 
 
Population        0.32    -1.02    -2.01 
          (0.93)    (2.24)    (9.15) 
 
Trend               1.77    6.64 
              (3.59)    (12.4) 
 
Trend Squared                -0.04 
                  (10.2) 
 
 
 
Newey and West (1986) t-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 2: The Effect of Legalization on the Price of Opium Exports from India   
 
 
Independent  
Variable         (1)       (2)         (3)         (4) 
   
 
Constant    1480.4    4689.1    2646.2    2791.1 
      (10.12)   (2.52)    (1.19)    (1.37) 
 
Legalization     -232.8    -363.7    166.9    146.6 
      (1.56)    (1.98)    (0.52)    (0.46) 
 
War          -278.2    -282.4    -308.5 
          (2.28)    (2.45)    (1.96) 
 
Price of Rice         282.6    202.7    218.0 
          (3.37)    (2.45)    (2.07) 
 
Population        -9.74    -3.46    -4.05 
          (2.07)    (0.59)    (0.76) 
 
Trend               -8.29    -5.62 
              (2.23)    (0.57) 
 
Trend Squared                -0.02 
                  (0.28) 
 
 
 
Newey and West (1986) t-statistics in parentheses 
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Figure 1: Opium Exports per Capita from India to China (in number of chests) 
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Figure 2: Price of Opium Exports in India (rupees per chest) 